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I. Introduction
On May 13 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that
an Internet search engine operator (ISEO), such as Google, is responsible for pro-
cessing personal information that appears on web pages published by third parties.
As a consequence, the CJEU ruled that an ISEO must consider requests from indi-
viduals to remove links to (legally available) information online (web pages) that re-
sult from a search on their name. Justifications for removal include cases where the
search results "appear to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or exces-
sive in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed".1
Limits to the delinking include "the nature of the information in question and its
sensitivity for the data subject's private life and on the interest of the public in hav-
ing that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according to the role
played by the data subject in public life".2 If the ISEO rejects the request, the indi-
vidual may ask relevant authorities to consider the case. In some cases, the ISEO
may be ordered to remove the links from search results.
The CJEU 's ruling just summarised concerned a Spanish citizen, Mario Costeja
Gonzalez. The events are by now very well known. Mr Costeja was displeased with
the fact that Google searches on his name prominently featured an old foreclosure
notice. This had been published, under legal requirement, by La Vanguardia - a
daily newspaper with a large circulation, particularly in Catalonia - in 1998, when a
property co-owned by Mr Costeja and Alicia Vargas Cots had been repossessed for
debt (see Figure 1). The Spanish Data Protection Authority (the Agencia Española
de Protección de Datos, AEPD) had rejected Mr Costeja's request to remove the ori-
ginal archived notice, but had asked Google to remove the referring links from its
index. Google had appealed, and the Spanish court had requested guidance from the
CJEU. The CJEU accepted Mr Costeja's claim that indexing the notice was irrele-
vant to Google's purposes as a search engine under the 1995 EU Data Protection
Directive. Contrary to the advisory opinion of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen,3
1 (CJEU 13 May 2014), 93. The incompatibility is with the Directive 95 /46 /EC (EU Data
Protection Directive).
2 (CJEU 13 May 2014), 81.
3 Opinion of 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:20 13:424.
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the CJEU ruled that Google was a European data controller with associated respon-
sibilities and so it ordered it to remove the links. Google complied.
The CJEU 's ruling triggered an international discussion on the so-called "right to
be forgotten".4 As a direct consequence of the ruling, Google decided to offer a
form online,5 through which users can request the delinking of personal informa-
tion; and it set up an Advisory Council6 in order to analyse the implications of the
ruling and provide guidelines about its implementation.
Regarding the requests, according to the Transparency Report published by
Google,7 by July 12 2015, the total number of URLs evaluated for removal was
1,027,207, corresponding to a total of 282,407 requests. So far, about 40% of the
URLS have been removed. Note that these figures cover about a year of activities.
They may seem huge but they are actually tiny when compared to the number of
URLs removed by Google for copyright reasons, following the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. Just during the June-July 2015 period, for example, Google dealt
with requests concerning almost 40m URLs.8 The difference is not quantitative but
qualitative. Requests about copyright issues are much less problematic and more
easily processable, whereas the requests concerning the right to be forgotten are
more complex, sensitive, and have to be managed by human experts, not by algo-
rithms, by studying case by case.
As for the Advisory Council, this held several meetings and seven public consul-
tations across Europe between September and November 2014, inviting experts and
the public to join the discussion in Madrid, Rome, Paris, Warsaw, Berlin, London,
and finally Brussels. It published its recommendations in February 20 15. 9 As one of
the eight independent members and the only philosopher and ethicist in the Council,
I had the privilege of participating in such consultations and in the discussions sur-
rounding them. That experience informs the following pages, in which I synthesise
some reflections on what I believe are the most problematic aspects of the debate on
"the right to be forgotten".
I wish I had a convincing answer for every question raised by the debate. I do
not. But I do hope that some mistakes can be avoided and some strategies dismissed
as fruitless, and that a clearer understanding of what exactly is at stake will help to
find a more satisfactory solution. I firmly believe that it is crucial to abandon pre-
conceived approaches for or against Google or the CJEU. Too much of the debate is
4 Since then, the literature on the topic has exploded. Julia Powles maintains an extensive
bibliography online at http://www.cambridge-code.org/googlespain.html.
5 It is available here: https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch.




9 All the recordings and the final report are available from https://www.google.com/advi
sorycouncil/.
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still blindly ideological, with socio-legal, ethical or political prejudices being
couched as critical and objective evaluations. The fact that the debate overlapped
with the European elections did not help to moderate its terms and generated some
strumentalization. That journalists with vested interests on either side of the debate
or merely in search for some headlines joined the conversation further constrained
the space for reasonable exchanges of ideas. All these factors remain a major hurdle
towards any constructive and fruitful dialogue.
II. Privacy vs. Freedom of Speech
By ordering the deletion of links to personal information legally published on-
line, the CJEU generated a challenging debate about privacy, freedom of speech,
and complex questions arising from the implementation of the ruling. What might
have begun as a small and irrelevant legal episode soon became the spark that ig-
nited a lively international debate on how to regulate the availability and accessibil-
ity of information online. It is easy to see now that it was a ticking bomb waiting to
explode.
The outcome of the current debate is likely to have long-lasting consequences
and represent a watershed in the evolution of the infosphere, the informational envi-
ronment represented by our increasingly hyperconnected world (Floridi 2014a, b).
When is it appropriate for a search engine to provide a link to truthful information
about a person that a third-party has legally published online? And what is the best
way of dealing with each request to remove from search results a link that refers to
such personal information? Similar questions may seem merely technical and bor-
ing. But they are actually points of collision of two immensely important spheres of
interest in our everyday life.
On the one hand, there is the right to privacy (European Convention on Human
Rights, art. 8; and Declaration on Human Rights, art. 12). In our case, this means al-
lowing legally available, truthful information about a person to sediment, without
being constantly rehearsed, and let bygones be bygones, so that the past might be-
come a springboard for the future, not a stone around its neck. We should "let us
not burden our remembrances with a heaviness that's gone" to quote Prospero from
Shakespeare's The Tempest (Act V, sc. 1), hence the imprecise but very sticky and
by now unavoidable label "right to be forgotten", which is at most a metaphorical
"right to be delinked" (in more Latin-based languages the so-called "right" sounds
even more dramatic, as in French: droit à l'oubli ; Italian: diritto all'oblio ; or Span-
ish: derecho al olvido).
On the other hand, there is the right to freedom of speech - also referred to as the
right to freedom of opinion and expression - which includes "the right to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and re-
gardless of frontiers" (European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10). Note that
the Declaration on Human Rights, art. 19 is slightly but significantly different for it
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also includes the right "to seek , receive and impart" information, quite a crucial
verb given the context. In our case, this means the freedom to refer to, and access
truthful information that is legally available online, hence the so-called "right to in-
formation".
Neither the "right to be forgotten" nor "the right to information" is actually a le-
gal right, so both are misnamed and give rise to a conflict by proxy. Both proxies,
and the actual rights behind them, are subject to legitimate interpretations, and
when such interpretations are in conflict, Europe and the United States dissent on
how to reconcile them. All this makes the debate even more "complex" and in need
of a "balance", two rather apt terms.
The debate is complex because there are many elements interacting with each
other. The actual ruling, with its pro and contra; the role of ISEOs as intermediaries
or data controllers; the difference between availability and accessibility of informa-
tion online; as we just saw, the so-called "rights" (to be forgotten, to information),
the real rights behind them (privacy and freedom of speech), and the ways in which
they are interpreted on the two sides of the Atlantic; the concepts of relevance and
of public interest, both very slippery; the procedural uncertainty about who should
decide which links are rightfully removed and who should be informed about it. I
shall return to these points below. Here, suffice to note that, because the debate is
complex, almost all parties involved seem to think that its resolution requires a bal-
ancing act. We saw above that the ruling itself relies on such a crucial concept.
However, the superficial agreement on the need for balance probably hides a deeper
disagreement on exactly what kind of balance may be needed. Let me use a very
simple analogy. Imagine you like French food but I like Italian food. We may find
a balance by alternating between going to a French restaurant one day and to an
Italian restaurant next time; or by going to a third restaurant that we both like, say
Spanish; or perhaps to another restaurant that serves both French and Italian food.
We could let a third friend choose... any combination of the former solutions and
more complicated ones are possible. The same holds true about the debate on the
right to be forgotten. While most parties involved seem keen on finding a balance,
few may have the same arrangement in mind.
Finding such an arrangement requires acknowledging the fact that there is a
problem to begin with. And this means clearing the ground from a mistaken view
that was repeatedly aired during the Council's meetings. Just because privacy and
freedom of speech are two fundamental ethical principles, this does not mean that
they are always compatible. Sometimes they can be in serious and genuine con-
flict. The naïve view to the contrary seems to hold that the two principles are like
two pillars of a democratic and liberal edifice. Pillars complement and sustain
each other; they do not and cannot clash. The trouble is that this is merely a nice
metaphor that can at most illustrate the view, but does not justify it. The truth is
rather that, like all other ethical principles, sometimes privacy and freedom of
speech need to be prioritized or reconciled in different ways. Think of the text-
book example of being honest vs. being altruistic. Both are fundamental principles
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and yet, if a Nazi asks where an innocent hides, you better lie, pace Kant, but
when you swear to tell the truth during a fair and legal trial, you better do so,
even if this may hurt an innocent. If there were no conflicts between fundamental
ethical principles most of the ethical debate would be superfluous. At the same
time, there is no fixed rule or mere algorithm to resolve the conflict, and only hu-
man intelligence can strike the right balance. The right to be forgotten is precisely
a case in which individual privacy and the social right to freedom of speech pull
the debate in opposite directions.
Now, a fruitful way of approaching this tension, and hence the need for a balanc-
ing act, is to consider what kind of information is in question and, for this, a distinc-
tion between availability and accessibility is in order.
III. Availability vs. Accessibility of Information
The CJEU's ruling and the issuing debate do not concern illegal information,
such as pedophilic images, which is regulated by other parts of the legal system.
The debate in the popular press has often been confused about this point. The ruling
concerns information that is legally published and made available online but should
not be linked and hence become easily accessible through a non-local search en-
gine. This means that it is perfectly legal to publish here, or on a t-shirt, the text of
the foreclosure notice that appeared in La Vanguardia (see Figure 1).
& Les dues meitats indivises d'un habitatge al carrer Montseny, 8, propietat
de MARIO COSTEJA GONZALEZ i ALICIA VARGAS COTS,
respectivament. Superficie: 90 m2. Carregues: 8,5 milions de ptes. Tipus
de subhasta: 2 milions de ptes. cadascuna de les meitats.
Source: http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1998/01/19/pagina-23/33842001/pdf.html?
search=Costeja %20 1 998.
Figure 1 : The Original Text of the Foreclosure Notice
Published by La Vanguardia
Yet it is no longer legal for Google to provide a link to it. If this seems counterin-
tuitive consider further that the original information remains accessible through
Google using other search terms (at the moment of writing, if you search "Alicia
Vargas Cots + La Vanguardia" on a European search engine you can still find the
link to the information in Figure /). And the information is also available by direct
access to the source: it is legal for La Vanguardia to maintain a local search engine
that works only on its own archive and provides a search through which that infor-
mation can be found. It is only a non-local search engine that ought not to make it
accessible, and only insofar as the name of the person requesting the delinking is
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concerned.10 This raises further questions about territoriality. Only non-local search
engines are affected by the ruling, such as Google or Bing, and yet by its very na-
ture any non-local search engine is such that it can provide access to the available
information through versions of itself that are not regional, in this case neither Span-
ish nor European but American, e.g. google.com. I shall return to this point in sec-
tion 4. Here, I wish to stress a different aspect that should counterbalance the coun-
terintuitiveness stressed above. In an analogue world, the availability ("the informa-
tion is there") of some information is usually coupled to its accessibility ("the infor-
mation that is there is known to be there")11 at least in principle. The best way to
block the accessibility to a printed book is to burn it, as all dictators have always
known in the past, because as long as it is available it is also potentially accessible.
In the infosphere, this is no longer the case. Since we obtain information by going
first through the gate of its online accessibility, today a new, two-tier approach to in-
formation is normal, with the availability of information online (content) being
completely detached from its accessibility (link). The decoupling and re-prioritising
of links first and contents next mean that removing the former is tantamount to hid-
ing the latter. More and more frequently, if something is inaccessible (not linked or
delinked) online in theory it simply becomes unavailable in practice. In the info-
sphere, the map becomes more important than the territory: erase something from
the map and it does not matter whether the territory remains unchanged. This shift
has at least one very significant consequence. It is disingenuous both to argue - as
many participants in the debate have - that the CJEU's ruling does not affect the
available information and to argue that an ISEO like Google, which has a virtual
monopoly on search in Europe, provides just the equivalent of a library catalogue.
For in both cases one is mistaken in reasoning in analogue terms ("the CJEU's rul-
ing is not burning books" vs. "Google is only indexing books") about digital docu-
ments. We must realize that linking and delinking are today ontological operations
about the territory. We should all accept and agree that the new battleground for the
control of information is the map, and that it is there that power is exercised.
Given this premise about our new information cartography, those who publish le-
gal contents should probably have a saying on whether and how it is linked. This is
what I shall argue in the next section.
IV. Transparency
We saw that today the indexing by search engines influences the life of the cor-
responding information: those who control the map control the territory. At what
10 Add to this the technical fact that it is actually the whole pdf that is no longer linked, not
just the specific relevant text. If you search for something else available on that pdf, this is not
delinked just because the personal information has been delinked.
1 1 Full (as opposed to partial) accessibility means that the information known to be there
can also be obtained, but I shall not use this finer distinction here.
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stage, if any, and how (from mere notification to co-decision) could publishers - the
owners of the territory, so to speak be involved when their legal information about
an individual may be delinked? During the consultations of the Advisory Board it
emerged quite clearly that publishers would like to be involved in the decisional
process about delinking requests as early as possible. For example, before Google
decides to delink some information published by Le Monde , it should consult the
newspaper to check whether the removal of the link clashes against the freedom of
the press or the public interest. To put it more technically: notification should be ex
ante.
Publishers should be fully involved in the evaluation of a delinking request. They
should have the right to know about whether someone has requested a search engine
to delink some information that they legally published; to be informed about what
decision has been taken by the search engine with regard to such a request; and to
appeal, if they disagree with the delinking decision. All this applies even more
strongly if a global approach to delinking were to be adopted (see section 4). Of
course, the risk is that, by informing the publishers, one may enable them to re-pub-
lish the same contents in ways that can by-pass the ruling and the delinking decision
itself, both of which concern only personal information and hence "name and sur-
name" searches. Yet this is a case in which I would recommend a principled ap-
proach. One could certainly implement disincentives, but the fact that publishers
may misuse the meta-information about a delinking request is not an argument
against their right to know and hence being able to appeal. This will be even more
obvious the further we move towards a situation in which not being indexed by a
search engine simply means "not being", full stop. In this case too, the report by the
Advisory Council has found a fair balance, by recommending Google to follow the
good practice of notifying the publishers "to the extent allowed by the law". It is a
bit vague, and I would have liked to see an even more incisive position in favour of
a full involvement of the publishers throughout the process, but it is a satisfactory
compromise.
Getting the publishers on board seems a sensible idea. After all we are talking
about personal information that has been legally published. However, even if one
crosses this particular bridge, one stumbles upon a new problem. Suppose that the
notification has been discussed and the link has been removed and not re-pubished,
should the public be informed about such removal? Once again, this may seem a
mere technicality, but unpack it and a significant difficulty surfaces. Currently, if
one searches for "Mario Costeja" on a European version of Google, e.g. google.co.
uk, one is informed that "Some results may have been removed under data protec-
tion law in Europe." There follows a link to further information about the ruling.
This public notification appears perhaps due to a similar procedure adopted when a
search engine removes content that infringes copyright laws. Yet publicising the
fact that some information about someone may have been delinked is problematic.
After all, being told that an individual may have gone through the effort of asking a
search engine to remove a link to some personal information may raise some serious
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suspicions, which may damage that individual as much as, and perhaps even more
than, the original information itself. So a current solution by Google is to add the
disclaimer seen above at the end of the first page of a search in any European-based
version of the engine, containing links to personal information, even if that person
has made no request and all and all the links are actually available. This is the cru-
cial value of the "may" in "may have been removed" clause. Perhaps they have not,
but the user is supposed to remain uncertain. This seems fine: users are no longer
able to infer whether someone has actually asked to have some links removed. But
there is an ironic twist. Part of the problem is that, if information about a removed
link is made public, it can be exploited to create services that can re-link the de-
linked material (see for example http://hiddenffomgoogle.afaqtariq.com/). And if no
detailed information is provided, the disclaimer may still work as a reminder and a
tempting invitation to look for the same personal information using a search engine
that is not based in Europe, such as google.com or duckduckgo.com.
Despite its shortcomings, the blank disclaimer seems to be the best compromise.
Those who dislike the solution do not enjoy a more palatable alternative. Suppose
one is not told that a search page one is viewing has had some links removed. This
appears to be more in line with the spirit of the CJEU's ruling and the protection of
privacy. The problem is that now one is truly kept in the dark. Not only one does
not get the link to some information one may be looking for, one is not even been
told that one is not getting it. In mathematical logic this is called negation by failure:
if you do not obtain some information, you assume that the information in question
is not there to be obtained in the first place. A bit like a fisherman assuming that if
he fails to catch any fish in the lake then there is no fish in the lake. This starts smel-
ling very badly, in terms of freedom of speech. Using our previous analogy, now
the map is missing some details and it is also hiding the fact that it is missing them.
The partial representation of the territory becomes indistinguishable from a more
complete one, and it is by default assumed to be equal to it. Well-informed users
will be chronically suspicious about what links they are obtaining any time they run
a search about someone. So they may end up using a non-European search engine
such as google.com by default anyway.
There is no easy solution because the CJEU's decision currently applies only to
ISEOs operating in Europe. No coordination among search engines is currently en-
visaged, either within Europe or internationally. At the moment of writing it still
seems that what happens in Europe stays in Europe, despite a ruling in France,12 the
guidelines issued by Article 29 Working Party,13 and a request by Isabelle Falque-
12 See http://www.legalis.net/spip.php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=4291 .
1 3 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-release/art29
_press_material/20 14 1126_wp29_press_release_ecj_de-listing.pdf In particular, on the first
page one can read: "The WP29 considers that in order to give full effect to the data subject's
rights as defined in the Court's ruling, de-listing decisions must be implemented in such a way
that they guarantee the effective and complete protection of data subjects' rights and that EU
law cannot be circumvented. In that sense, limiting de-listing to EU domains on the grounds
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Pierrotin of the French data protection authority that any de-listing is applied world-
wide.14 This is known as the territoriality issue. It is a thorny problem that deserves
its own section.
V. Territoriality
As specified above, the C JEU 's ruling currently affects only ISEO insofar as they
operate in Europe. The same personal information no longer accessible through
European search engines, such as google.co.uk, is still accessible through non-Euro-
pean search engines, such as google.com or DuckDuckGo. The ruling may seem as
ineffective as closing the door of the house while leaving all the windows open. Yet
the reality is more complicated.
For centuries, roughly since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), political geography
has provided jurisprudence with an easy answer to the question of how far a ruling
should apply, and that is as far as the national borders within which the legal author-
ity operates. A bit like "my place my rules, your place your rules". It may now
seem obvious, but it took a long time and immense suffering to reach such a simple
approach. Which is still perfectly fine today, as long as one operates within a physi-
cal space. However, the Internet is a logical not a physical space (more on this dis-
tinction presently), and the territoriality problem is due to an ontological misalign-
ment between these two spaces, in the following sense.
The CJEU's ruling is based on an offline physical space: the Westphalian system
of sovereign states with controllable borders, which has served us so well for so
long. In contrast, search engines operate within an online logical space of nodes,
links, protocols, resources, services, URLs, interfaces and so forth. Which means
that any place is only a click away. This is a new space that we are still learning to
manage. You may compare the difference between the two spaces to the difference
between the physical size of a chessboard, which may vary considerably, and its lo-
gical space, which is always the same structure of 64 squares in eight rows and eight
columns arranged in two alternating colours. A physical space can be constrained
by rules: think about the problem of immigration across physical borders. But a lo-
gical space is constituted by rules. Think of a pawn, which can move in a given
way on the chessboard because the rules say so, not because of some physical possi-
bilities or impediments. The accessibility of some personal information online be-
longs to a logical space. If there are problems in the logical space, this is probably
where they should be solved (Floridi 2009, 2013). A ruling that concerns the Inter-
that users tend to access search engines via their national domains cannot be considered a suf-
ficient means to satisfactorily guarantee the rights of data subjects according to the ruling. In
practice, this means that in any case de-listing should also be effective on all relevant domains,
including .com".
14 See http://www.wsj .com/articles/ffench-privacy-watchdog-orders-google-to-expand-right-
to-be-forgotten- 1 434098033 .
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net cannot rely on the old, Westphalian solution. Note that this misalignment of
spaces does not cause only problems, it also provides solutions. The non-territorial-
ity of the Internet works wonders for the unobstructed circulation of information. In
China, for example, the government has to make a constant and sustained effort to
control information online. But the same feature proves awkward if you are trying
to implement the right to be forgotten. The report issued by the Advisory Council
strikes a fair balance, recommending to implement the delinking policy at the Euro-
pean level: if a request is approved, links are removed from all European version of
Google's search engine. Personally, I accepted this decision but I also argued within
the Council in favour of a more restricted, nation-based delinking, for the following
reasons.
Although users can easily by-pass the current restriction, according to Google
very few do, preferring to rely on their local search engines in their languages.
Spaniards use google.es, Italians google.it, Germans google.de, and so forth. The
so-called "power of default" is enormous. It follows that if Alice, who is French
and lives in Paris, asks Google to delink some legally published information about
herself, the most effective implementation is to remove the links from Alice's local
search engine, namely google.fr. It is mostly useless to remove them also from
google.pt because virtually nobody in France will ever care to check information
about Alice using the Portuguese version of Google, while the very few who may
care will not be deterred by a pan-European delinking anyway. Someone who is de-
termined to find a piece of information about Alice will simply use a search engine
not based in Europe or indeed other means. Recall that the information itself is not
erased. This is also why the argument that delinking personal information will be an
obstacle to journalists' investigations is unpersuasive: investigative journalism is
not really about googling a name. Back to the original point, it follows that, if the
C JEU 's goal was to "slow down" the accessibility of personal information online
that an individual in Europe wants to see delinked, this much has been achieved. At
least temporarily. There remains the issue stressed in the previous section: Google
displays the removal notification at the bottom of the search results page for name
searches in Europe. As the ruling gets discussed and people start seeing removal no-
tices at the end of searches about individuals, savvy users may develop new search
strategies.
Some have bitten the bullet and argued that all this is correct, but this is precisely
why the delinking should be global, that is, applied to all versions of any search en-
gine world-wide. I agree that a global approach to delinking would be more coher-
ent with the ruling. One would be closing the door of the house and all its windows
as well. In the case of Google, this would mean delinking the information in ques-
tion also from its Brazilian version (google.com.br), for example. However, I dis-
agree with the approach itself because global delinking is probably both unfeasible -
since countries are unlikely to accept a European ruling without questions - and
dangerous, since undemocratic and illiberal countries should have no right to im-
pose a global delinking ban on personal information. Arguments in favour of a
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global delinking assume that the debate on the right to be forgotten has been settled
and that the CJEU is right while everyone else who may disagree with it is wrong,
including the United States, or, in the previous example, Brazil. This is clearly a
flawed assumption. The controversy is still unresolved and the current situation is
nothing more than a compromise, and a rather messy one at that. Even the CJEU
and the Advocate General disagreed among themselves. The ruling by the CJEU is
more like a wrong step in the right direction: it is based on a mistaken physicalisa-
tion of a logical space, and making such space all-encompassing is not a solution
but a worsening of the problem. Since a global delinking would not reject but "ab-
solutise" the Westphalian approach - it would try to make the physical space so in-
clusive as to ensure that any logical space must fall within it - it would still have to
follow the old rule "my place my rules, but your place your rules", but then how
could one explain to Brazilians that some legally published personal information
online should no longer be indexed in a Brazilian search engine because the CJEU
has ruled so? Would the opposite also apply? Could Brazilians appeal? And how
could one determine what is of public interest in this or that country? Maybe an in-
vestor from Brazil does need to know whether a person has (for example) had
some properties repossessed in the past. Finally, consider the following scenario.
The day after some global delinking starts being enforced, nothing will stop unde-
mocratic and illiberal places from hosting a search engine that provides links to all
information anyway. It would be ironic if we were to find information using a
search engine based in North Korea because it were more complete than the local
ones. Geographical space is no longer the solution, so the approach recommended
by the Advisory Council is a good compromise, which adapts an outdated answer
to a new question. It does not work very well but it is the classic "better than noth-
ing" solution. Opting for a global delinking would be, instead, the classic "perfect
is the enemy of good". It would be just another way of demanding that the world
adapts to European decisions. Some people may see it as a form of digital neo-co-
lonialism.
When it came to finalising the text of the report, I was happy, pragmatically, to
concede the point about a pan-European delinking because this simply adds nothing
to a national one, in terms of effective protection of individuals. At the moment, a
national or European approach may still be preferable. Google already deals with
comparable cases of defamation complaints on a national basis only. So it might
have been sufficient to delink "Mario Costeja Gonzalez" from google.es only. As I
stressed above, delinking it from other European search engines seems ineffective
but not harmful anyway because Spanish users are no more likely to use them than
they are to use google.com. It would be a very different story if one were to argue
that some legally published personal information online should be removed (i.e. the
information itself, not just the link) altogether, or blocked at the source, e.g. by not
allowing any search engine to index it in the first place. I am not against similar op-
tions, quite the opposite, but I suspect that, in order to consider them, we would
have to have a serious debate about how really harmful the information in question
needs to be to justify such a drastic solution. Yet this is something with which few
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people in favour of the right to be forgotten seems to be willing to engage and prefer
to swing back to "it's just a link" kind of position.
If we are serious about enabling individuals to have more and better control of
their personal information online, we need to think in terms of designing the right
constitutive rules of the logical space of online information. This is not easy, but
more collaborative approaches may be envisioned, in some wiki-like way, through
tagging or ranking. And policies about firewalls, robot.txt files, or IP addresses
show that we have already begun the process. Geolocation could be used to remove
links from google.com only for searches conducted within the EU, for example.
This would mean that the same search about personal information on google.com
would return all links if carried on in Washington but not when carried on in Brus-
sels. Of course, there are always technical ways of by-passing such limitations.
VPN providers, for example, let you change your IP location. The fact that Chinese
authorities know this too well casts an odd light on the whole debate, one concern-
ing power and control. This is why an international agreement on the right to be for-
gotten should be pursued. The question is who is or should be in charge of such
deep transformations in our "onlife" experiences, the topic of the next section.
VI. Power
One of the crucial questions of our age is who may legitimately exercise what
power over which kind of information. The question is complicated because one
may interpret "who", "what power" and "which information" in many ways and
end up talking at cross-purposes. In the previous sections, we saw what "what
power" and "which information" may mean. Regarding the "who", in the context of
the debate on the right to be forgotten there are seven entities that may be legiti-
mately involved:
1 . the person to whom the information refers, e.g., Mario Costeja González;
2. the publisher of the information, e.g., the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia ;
3. a search engine, e.g., Google Spain;
4. search engine users, that is, the public;
5. a national Data Protection Agency, e.g., the Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos;
6. a national court of justice, e.g., the Audiencia Nacional; and finally,
7. theCJEU.
I argued at the end of the previous section that there should also be an eighth en-
tity, which is currently missing: an international body that could ensure that a de-
linking legislation may be agreed upon by all liberal and democratic countries, as it
happens in many other contexts.
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In terms of power, # 5, # 6 and # 7 are legal entities that do not generate the per-
sonal information or its links - the two relevant types of information under discus-
sion - but can determine how the other entities manage both.
The public (# 4) is the only entity in the list that has no direct power in either gen-
erating or controlling the personal information in question or the links provided by
a search engine. However, the public exercises a decisive "passive power", insofar
as the debate must refer to the "public interest", or rather a lack thereof, in order to
determine whether the links to some personal information in question should remain
available. In order words, the public is the reason why we are having a debate at all.
The mess concerns # 1, # 2, and # 3. Sometimes a person has both creative and
controlling power with regard to the personal information that he or she wishes to
see delinked. One may have generated the information and made it public. For ex-
ample, so far the highest number of URLs removed by Google from its search re-
sults (8009) concerned Facebook.15 In this case, it seems reasonable to expect the
person to seek the removal of the personal information itself first, before asking to
see it delinked.
The search engine has no creative power with respect to the personal information
it indexes, but it has both creative and controlling power over its links and how they
are presented. Such power could be exercised more imaginatively, but the ruling
dictates that the links have to be removed, not, for example, lower-ranked, ranked
historically, or annotated. This is a pity because much more could be done, in terms
of sedimentation of information, if ISEOs were asked to find alternative solutions to
the mere removal of links to legally available information, such as an old Anti-So-
cial Behaviour Order (ASBO) now irrelevant.16
The publisher, such as The Guardian or the BBC , used to be the most powerful
of all seven entities involved, because it has both creative and controlling power
over the personal information in question. A publisher can regulate or block access
to personal information quite easily. Its intervention makes any gerrymandered de-
linking no longer a problem. And it can operate discretely, without creating any
Streisand effect. However, we saw that the ruling has had the self-defeating effect
of forcing ISEO to act as gatekeepers, giving them even more power to decide what
is or is not left on the map. At the moment, publishers are disempowered. They are
merely notified about links removed, and even this is under discussion. They have
no clear right of appeal, although they can informally negotiate a re-linking with a
search engine, as it has happen with both The Guardian and the BBC. All this is un-
satisfactory and in need of rectification. I remain convinced that, while we work on
a better solution for the logical space of the Internet, a sensible procedure would be
15 http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en-US.
16 In the United Kingdom, an ASBO is a civil order made against an individual proved to
have engaged in anti-social behaviour, normally some minor incident that does not warrant
criminal prosecution.
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for an individual to request first the publisher to remove or block the availability of
the personal information in question. Failing that, one could ask the search engine
to delink it. If that does not work, an appeal to the national DPA or the relevant
court in one's country would be the next step. And if that does not work, one could
appeal to the CJEU. At each stage, the fact that the previous request was rejected
should be documented and make a difference. In short, publishers should be the first
to be consulted, not ISEOs, and their evaluation should matter.
VII. Limits
The ruling suggested some limits to which personal information may be delinked.
Delinking is not admissible when the personal information, which would no longer
be easily accessible, matters to the public good. This seems obvious at first sight,
but a moment of critical reflection shows that there are plenty of borderline cases in
which it is quite difficult to decide when information is of public interest. This is
why every request needs to be carefully analysed individually, case by case, further
empowering ISEOs. A disappointing solution is to reduce information that is of
public interest to information that concerns public figures. This step merely doubles
the difficulties. On the one had, it runs the risk of making some personal informa-
tion - that about individuals that may be of public interest even if the individuals
are no public figures - more easily delinkable because no longer subject to the ex-
ception. On the other hand, it shifts now the problem to defining when an individual
is a public figure. In the information society everyone can be a public figure for
15 minutes, to paraphrase Andy Warhol, but precisely because an individual goes
through many stages in life, it seems very difficult to identify the public nature and
interest of some personal information without referring to the context within, and
the purpose for which that information is being sought. Yet these two variables
easily change through time and circumstances and cannot be easily forecast. Person-
al information that was of public interest may no longer be so for some time, and
then turn out to be so again in the future. A coherent conclusion is that delinking
should be equally dynamic, yet this, if feasible, would generate a rather chaotic
situation.
The situation hardly improves when the debate refers to the relevance of the per-
sonal information in question. Recall that the ruling indicates that a delinking may
be granted if it is "irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those
purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed". As philosophers and logicians
know too well, determining the relevance of some information is a very hard prob-
lem to solve. In this case too, it is impossible to fix the relevance once and for all, by
devising a simple and universal rule, for relevance is dynamic and it is certainly a
mistake to reduce it to a mere chronological matter - as the ruling seems to invite
one to do - as if old information were irrelevant when compared to new one. Old
news is not synonymous with irrelevant news. What someone had for breakfast this
morning may be totally irrelevant compared to what that person did fifty years ago.
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If we combine these difficulties - public interest in the personal information, pub-
lic role of the referent of the personal information, and relevance of the personal in-
formation - paradoxically, one may argue that Mr Costeja has now become quite a
public figure and that the personal information about his past is both relevant and of
public interest and so should be re-linked.
VIII. Processing
The last problem I wish to analyse concerns whether an ISEO such as Google is
correctly defined as "data controller". The definition of "data controller" in the EU
Data Protection Directive (Directive 95 /46 /EC), is based on a definition of data
processing (Article 2) that is so inclusive and generic that it cannot fail to support
the CJEU's ruling:
(b) 'processing of personal data' ('processing') shall mean any operation or set of opera-
tions which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as
collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction;
In the UK, the Information Commissioner's Office had to issue a 20-page guid-
ance in order to "explain the difference between a data controller and a data proces-
sor" (Information Commissioner's Officer 2014). The guidance rightly concluded
that, according to the Directive, basically anyone doing anything with data is pro-
cessing the data, and hence can qualify as a data controller. The Directive (adopted
in 1995), which predates Google (founded in 1998) and the world of Social Media,
does not appear to distinguish between formatting data, e.g. in terms of a barcode,
retrieving data, e.g. by a scanner reading the barcode, transmitting data, e.g. by an
electronic cashier sending the retrieved barcode data to a database, and processing
data, e.g. by a computer that collects many retrieved barcode data and builds the
profile of a customer. Data processing should be something much more specific that
merely doing anything to or with data and /or information (another important dis-
tinction (Floridi 2010) underestimated by the Directive) but, at the moment, such
specificity is lost in the Directive. The disappointment is that the CJEU could have
followed the advice of the Advocate General, Niilo Jääskinen, who correctly recom-
mended that "In his opinion, the internet search engine provider cannot in law or in
fact fulfill the obligations of the controller provided in the Directive in relation to
personal data on source web pages hosted on third party servers". (CJEU 25 June
2013) The CJEU could and should have interpreted the Directive much more strin-
gently, concluding that a link to some legally available information does not process
the information in question. It seems clear that the definitions of "data controller"
and "data processor" themselves should be improved in the future.
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IX. Conclusion
In this article I focused on some salient problems surrounding the debate on the
right to be forgotten. They are not the only ones, but they have emerged as being
among the most pressing since the issuing of the ruling. Whitehead famously re-
marked, in his Process and Reality , that "The safest general characterization of the
European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato"
(Whitehead 1929). In its tum, Plato's philosophy may be safely characterised as a
philosophy of memory. From such a broad perspective it becomes obvious that the
right to be forgotten is re-defining a very significant aspect of the European philoso-
phical tradition. It is becoming a defining issue of our time because it is about how
mature information societies will cope and deal with their memories.
Our culture is shifting its emphasis from the duty to remember to the right to be
forgotten. I hope the shift may be evidence that some of the most tragic wounds in
our European history are now healed. But I am concerned that it may be a sign that
we are tired of confronting our past mistakes and responsibilities. Either way, I sus-
pect that our technologies and their "undo" facilities might have quietly formatted
our expectations about how much it is actually reversible in real life and should be
rightfully archived.
Some sensitive and private information from the past needs to remain in the past,
to ensure that memory does not undermine the future. This "remembering without
recalling" is how I like to define closure. It is a difficult process that humanity has
fine-tuned for a long time. It can already be found in the Bible, for example, where
Isaiah (43:18) recommends: "Remember not the former things, nor consider the
things of old". He is talking about the exodus, something that he certainly does not
want to see forgotten, but that should not be constantly represented as the only per-
spective for Israel. Such a fine way of dealing with closure has become difficult on
the web, a flatland lacking historical depth. Information is dynamically structured
"on the fly" by our searches, and there are only endless first-pages to which we con-
stantly add more information. We must ensure that the right kind of personal infor-
mation may be remembered (no removal of past information) without being con-
stantly recalled (no unnecessary resurfacing of past information). Getting this bal-
ance right is difficult but imperative, because we are working on one of the main
roots of our culture.
Zusammenfassung
Der Artikel, der aus der Sicht eines Mitglieds des Google Experten-Beirats verfasst
wurde, analysiert einige der vordringlichsten Probleme, die durch die Debatte über
das sogenannte „Recht auf Vergessenwerden" aufgekommen sind. Folgendes sind
die wesentlichen Thesen des Aufsatzes: 1. Die Debatte über das sogenannte „Recht
auf Vergessenwerden" (delinking) betrifft Fälle, in denen es für eine nicht-lokale
Suchmaschine nicht länger angebracht ist, einen Link zu wahren Informationen über
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